

# DIS P LAY

Rando Display is the crispy fellow of Rando – a contemporary homage to German romanesque typefaces from the late 19th/ early 20th century such as Anker Romanisch (Schelter & Giesecke) or Hamburger Römisch (Schriftguß A.G.). In this period many foundries published their own versions categorized »romanesque« often with same designs but with different names. The new Rando is designed with 5 weights in roman and italic. (Display italics are in preparation.)

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# RANDO

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# Re 169 LAND

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“THE SPECTER OF USELESSNESS” took its modern turn in the development of cities, whose migrants no longer had land to work under their feet. People moved to cities as dispossessed agricultural refugees, hoping that mechanized factories would provide for them. However, in London, to take a representative example, in 1840 there were six

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# David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus the first modern theorists of uselessness,

⌵ 42pt ≡ 40pt AV -10

Ricardo probing how markets and industrial machines reduced the need for labor, Malthus squaring up the perverse consequences of

⌵ 30,5pt ≡ 30pt AV -5

Neither envisioned brains as a remedy for the oversupply of hands. In the early industrial era very few laborers could enter higher education; upward mobility was rare. And even the most enlightened

⌵ 24pt ≡ 25pt

Malthus, like Adam Smith before him and John Ruskin after him, viewed factory labor as brain-deadening. So

⌵ 22pt ≡ 23,5pt

One of the real achievements of modern society is to remove the opposition between mass and mental. Educational institutions have improved standards of numeracy and literacy on such an extent which the

⌵ 16pt ≡ 18pt

The Depression-era dream of a talented poor boy—or rarely, girl—becoming a doctor or lawyer is one which today seems, as it were, a routine sort of dream. Rough estimates put the upward mobility of children of unskilled laborers into the

⌵ 14pt ≡ 16,2pt

These indubitable achievements only pose Ricardo's early proposition in a new and painful form. The skills economy still leaves behind the majority; more finely, the education system turns out large numbers of unemployable educated young people, at least unemployable in the domains for which they have trained. In its modern form, Ricardo's proposition is that the skills society may need only a relatively small

⌵ 10pt ≡ 13,5pt

Three forces shape the specter of uselessness as a modern threat: the global labor supply, automation, and the management of ageing. Each is not quite what it might at first glance seem. When the press writes scare stories about the global labor supply draining jobs from rich to poor places, the story is usually presented as a "race to the bottom" simply in terms of wages. Capitalism supposedly looks for labor wherever labor is cheapest. This story is half wrong. A kind of cultural selection is also at work, so that jobs leave high-wage countries like the United States and Germany, but migrate to low-wage

⌵ 8pt ≡ 10,5pt AV +5

Indian call centers are a good example. The jobs in these centers are performed by people who are at least bilingual; they have refined their language skills so that the caller doesn't know whether she has reached Hartford or Bombay. Many call-center workers have had two or more years of university training; more, on the job they have been well trained. Indian call centers stress "stretch-learning," which is to have so much information in one's head that one can answer most conceivable questions quickly, thus enabling a rapid turnover in calls. The centers also train their workers in "human-resource skills," so that, for instance, impatience is never evident to a befuddled caller. The Indian workers are better educated and better trained than call-service workers in the West (excluding Ireland and Germany, which operate at near Indian standard). The wages for this work are indeed abominable, paid to highly capable people.

⌵ 6pt ≡ 9pt AV +15

AND SOMETHING OF THE SAME phenomenon appears in some industrial jobs which have migrated to the global South. Here a telling instance is automobile subassembly plants on the northern border of MEXICO. The people doing very routine forms of labor are quite often highly skilled mechanics who have left auto-body shops to work

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# It is the most fearful image of economic race to the bottom: children working in

⌵ 42pt ≡ 40pt AV -10

This image is not false but, rather—incomplete. It is the labor market also looks for talent on the cheap. The appeal to employers of

⌵ 30,5pt ≡ 30pt AV -5

Such capable workers prove good at problem solving, especially when something goes wrong with job routines. In turn, the people who take these jobs are often quite entrepreneurial. In the Mexican

⌵ 24pt ≡ 25pt

The credit incentive is not quite as powerful in India, where the driving force is entrepreneurial subcontract-

⌵ 22pt ≡ 23,5pt

In the Indian calls centers, many workers, once trained, have started small businesses which subcontract call-center work from the large foreign firms. Of course it's important to keep this in perspective.

⌵ 16pt ≡ 18pt

Just as the bulk of global South jobs employ dispossessed farm laborers, so the hope of becoming a small businessman or businesswoman will remain for many just a hope though the number of small-business start-ups in India,

⌵ 14pt ≡ 16,2pt

What needs to be stressed is that these are not Ricardo's people. They cannot be classified simply as victims because they participate in the system and have an interest in it. The reason I stress this is the consequence at home. They are of higher status than their peers in the global North, if less well paid. Their combination of motivation and training, their Bildung, constitutes a particular draw for

⌵ 10pt ≡ 13,5pt

At home, the people who lose out would have to increase their human capital to compete, but few can do so; uncompetitive with these foreign peers, they face being no longer needed. The specter of uselessness here intersects with the fear of foreigners, which, beneath its crust of simple ethnic or race prejudice, is inflected with the anxiety that foreigners may be better armed for the tasks of survival. That anxiety has a certain basis in reality. Globalization names, among other things, a perception that the sources of human energy are shifting, and that those in the already developed world may be left

⌵ 8pt ≡ 10,5pt AV +5

The second specter of uselessness lurks in automation. The fear that machines will replace humans is ancient. The appearance of the first steam-driven spinning looms caused riots among French and British weavers; by the end of the nineteenth century it became painfully evident to many steelworkers that they would be "deskilled," machines doing their complicated labors, the men reduced to low-wage, routine tasks. In the past, however, the threat of automation was overdramatized. The problem lay in the design and development of the machines themselves. Let me give a personal example. My grandfather, an industrial designer, worked for sixteen years (from 1925 to 1941) on the prototype of a robotic arm capable of one-millimeter manipulation: the gears and pulleys required for this high-tech machine cost a fortune, and the robotic arm itself needed constant readjustment. After wasting a fortune on my

⌵ 6pt ≡ 9pt AV +15

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This story was repeated throughout the field of industrial design. The only real savings brought through true automation in which most or all of the production process occurs via machines appeared in those large volume, heavy industries which produced goods like electric cables and metal pipes. Thanks to the revolu-

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# In service labor, the automation could convert the science fiction of the past

⌵ 42pt ≡ 40pt AV -10

I'm thinking of intelligent voice answering devices automation's future threat to the call center or bar-code readers, which have

⌵ 30,5pt ≡ 30pt AV -5

In service labor, automation has converted the science fiction of the past into technological reality. I'm thinking of intelligent voice answering devices automation's future threat to the call center or

⌵ 24pt ≡ 25pt

Electronics enable, further, the automation of quality control the human eye replaced by the more rigorous

⌵ 22pt ≡ 23,5pt ⌵ 22pt ≡ 23,5pt

Manufacturers use these technologies in a particular way. Automation permits manufacturers not only to respond quickly to changes in demand, since the machines can be quickly reconfigured, but also

⌵ 16pt ≡ 18pt

Automation now truly delivers productivity gains and brings labor savings. Here are two examples: from 1998 to 2002, the Sprint Corporation increased its productivity 15 percent by using advanced voice recognition software

⌵ 14pt ≡ 16,2pt

In heavy industry, from 1982 to 2002 steel production in the United States rose from 75 million tons to 102 million tons even as the number of steelworkers dropped from 289,000 to 74,000. These jobs were not exported; for the most part, sophisticated machines took over. In the past, when sociologists thought about automation, they imagined that new or more white collar and human

⌵ 10pt ≡ 13,5pt

This belief informed the "postindustrial" thesis advanced by both Daniel Bell and Alain Touraine. The shift idea made sense, given the state of machines fifty years ago; for practical purposes, these machines were serviceable for only mechanical tasks. The machines we now possess can subtract labor across the board: the job losses at Sprint were in its human service sector. What sort of machines are these? When the watchmaker Jacques de Vaucanson fabricated a mechanical flute player in the mid eighteenth century, the wonder of the robot seemed its likeness to a living human

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In the spirit of Vaucanson, much automation technology today still focuses on imitating the human voice or the human head the latter in smart surveillance cameras which swivel and focus on anything the machine "sees" as unusual. But other technologies do not mimic human beings, notably computing technologies, which reckon at speeds no person could. The image of replacing a pair of hands by a machine is therefore inexact: as the work analyst Jeremy Rifkin has observed, the realm of uselessness expands as machines do things of economic value of which human beings are incapable. Both global job migration and true automation are special cases which affect some, but not all, labor. Ageing defines a much more sweeping domain of uselessness. Everyone grows old, and, enfeebled, we all become at some point useless in the sense of unproductive. Age as a measure of uselessness is, however,

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The first is through sheer prejudice. When in the early 1990s I interviewed people in the advertising world my subjects worried that they would be “over the hill” by the time they turned thirty, “out of it” by the time they turned forty. The cutting edge organization indeed tends

In advertising and media, there is the prejudice against age, combined with

⌵ 42pt ≡ 40pt AV -10

Ageism embodies an very obvious paradox. Modern medicine enables us to live and to work longer than in the past. It made sense,

⌵ 30,5pt ≡ 30pt AV -5

Today, 50 percent of American males live into their early eighties, and most are healthy into their early seventies. When retirement age is kept to the old standard, males now spend fifteen to twenty

⌵ 24pt ≡ 25pt

Burnout more accurately applies to the character of work than to the physical state of the worker. It would

⌵ 22pt ≡ 23,5pt

Age more directly touches the question of talent if we think about how long a skill lasts. If you are an engineer, how long will the skills you learned in university serve you? Less and less. “Skills extinc-

⌵ 16pt ≡ 18pt

One estimate for computer repairmen is that they have to relearn their skills three times in the course of their working lifetimes; the figure is about the same for doctors. That is, when you acquire a skill, you don’t have

⌵ 14pt ≡ 16,2pt

Here labormarket economics intrudes in a particularly destructive way. An employer could choose either to retrain a fifty year old to get up to date or to hire a bright young thing of twenty five already up to speed. It’s much cheaper to hire the bright young thing cheaper both because the older employee will have a higher salary base and because retraining programs for working employ-

⌵ 10pt ≡ 13,5pt

There’s a further social wrinkle in this replacement process. Older employees tend to be more selfpossessed and judgmental of their employers than younger workers. In retraining programs, older workers behave like other mature students, judging the value of the skill on offer and the ways it is taught in light of how they themselves have lived. The experienced worker complicates the meaning of what he or she learns, judging its worth in terms of his or her past. The Young Turk, by contrast, is a stereotype falsified by many studies of young workers themselves: lacking

⌵ 8pt ≡ 10,5pt AV +5

In firms, age thus makes an important difference between what the economist Albert Hirschmann has called “exit” and “voice.” Young workers, more pliant, favor exit when discontented; older workers, more judgmental, give voice to their discontents. Though Hirschmann sees this as a divide in all firms, it matters above all to those at the cutting edge, impatient as these businesses are with corporate second thoughts and measured introspection. Just because flexible firms expect employees to move around, and just because these firms do not reward service and longevity, the employer’s choice is clear. The younger person is both cheaper and less trouble. The many firms which do invest in the skills of their employees over the long term tend to more traditional kinds of organization. Hirschmann’s view is that such investments will be made particularly by firms which count

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In those firms which do abandon the structures of social capitalism, the personal consequence of focusing on young talent is that as experience increases it has less value. I found in my interviewing that this slighting of experience was notably strong among consultants, who have a professional interest in

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# Work in changing institutions may lead to suspicion of long entrenched

⌵ 42pt ≡ 40pt AV -10

Of course consultants do not come all in one piece; much of the work done by the Boston Consulting Group, for instance, can

⌵ 30,5pt ≡ 30pt AV -5

The effect that the boom in the 1990s has had, however, helped to legitimate more superficial, quick strike forms of consulting, embodied by the intervention in the BBC described by Georgina

⌵ 24pt ≡ 25pt

In that strike, “skill” became defined as the ability to do something new, rather than to draw on what one had

⌵ 22pt ≡ 23,5pt

The consultant engineering sudden change has to draw on a key element in the new economy’s idealized self: the capacity to surrender, to give up possession of an established reality. The formula

⌵ 16pt ≡ 18pt

Skills extinction is a durable feature of technological advance. Automation is indifferent to experience. Market forces continue to make it cheaper to buy skills fresh rather than to pay for retraining. And the draw of capa-

⌵ 14pt ≡ 16,2pt

These conditions combined give the specter of uselessness solid substance in the lives of many people today. The brute mantra of “skill” cannot, alone, address them. Before addressing what specific kind of skill could address them, I need to relate this economic overview to the public sphere. The specter of uselessness poses a challenge to the welfare state the state broadly conceived

⌵ 10pt ≡ 13,5pt

What will it offer people who are cast aside? The record of response in the late twentieth century was not good. Even in countries like Britain and Germany, which have good quality job retraining programs, it proved difficult to cure unemployment resulting from automation. The twentieth century welfare state treated automation ineptly because policymakers suffered a failure of imagination. The planners failed to understand how fundamentally automation could change the very nature of the productive process. In the steel industry, for instance, the same forces which

⌵ 8pt ≡ 10,5pt AV +5

Not only did government shy away from the enormity of this transformation; labor unions resisted thinking the matter through, focusing on job protection for existing workers rather than on shaping the future workforce. The American labor negotiator Theodore Kheel, founder of Automation House, spoke as a prophet in the wilderness when he argued to Western governments that the only “remedy” for true automation was to make paid jobs out of previously unpaid work like child care and community service. The welfare state proved equally inept at dealing with age. The development of publicly funded pension and medical systems in the twentieth century can be understood as a form of wealth redistribution, shifting benefits from younger to older generations. Now the increasing longevity of old people strains this wealth redistribution, as does the falling birthrate in

⌵ 6pt ≡ 9pt AV +15

Long ago Emile Durkheim, in “The Division of Labor”, has understood the immense value

And as a general rule, identity concerns not so much what you do as where you belong.

In the 1970s, it seemed clear to me that labor mattered deeply to working-class men

I interviewed as a source of family and communal honor, quite apart from whatever

**Their work identity lay in the social consequences of their labor. To working-class this**

⌵ 28pt ≡ 30pt ⌵ -5

TO women in the labor market, it seemed to me then, the dignity afforded by work seemed to matter less. And to middleclass workers, the contents of a job appeared

In retrospect I see that I got both class and gender wrong. I got it wrong then, and time has since sorted things out differently today. Many working-class women

But others permanently labored, and to them work mattered in the same familial and communal ways it did to the men. Claire Siegelbaum has pointed out that

Working-class women tended not to share the importance of their work with their spouses, because to do so would challenge sex roles within their families.

And I also got wrong the investment of middle-class men in the substance of their work. A number of studies in the early 1980s showed there was just little

⌵ 20pt ≡ 22pt

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⌵ 20pt ≡ 22pt



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Localized Forms

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Rando Display Family of 5 Weights

Regular  
Medium  
Semibold  
Bold  
Black

*Italics of Rando Display  
are in preperation.*

Also Available

Rando Regular, Medium, Semibold,  
**Bold, Black** */with Italics*

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[www.camelot-typefaces.com](http://www.camelot-typefaces.com)

RANDO DISPLAY was designed by Maurice Göldner.  
First designs were produced in the end of 2012. Rando was  
tested and used during the design process by the Leipzig based  
studio Lamm & Kirch.  
Many thanks to Thomas Thiemich for his technical know-how  
and support.

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[www.camelot-typefaces.com/rando](http://www.camelot-typefaces.com/rando)

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Language Coverage

Afrikaans, Albanian, Bosnian, Croatian, Czech,  
Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish,  
French, German, Icelandic, Irish, Italian,  
Norwegian, Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish,  
Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese,  
Polish, Romanian, Slovak, Slovenian, Turkish

File Formats

Available for desktop and web use  
Desktop format: otf  
Web formats: woff, eot, ttf